CPLR 301: Doing Business Doctrine Liberalized by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 42 
Number 3 Volume 42, January 1968, Number 3 Article 14 
April 2013 
CPLR 301: Doing Business Doctrine Liberalized 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1968) "CPLR 301: Doing Business Doctrine Liberalized," St. John's Law Review: 
Vol. 42 : No. 3 , Article 14. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol42/iss3/14 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Recently, the Court of Appeals, in Romano v. Romano,33 held
that the three year period of limitation of CPLR 214(7) was,
indeed, a condition precedent. As a result of this decision, it may
safely be surmised that CPLR 203(f), the alternative discovery
section, which apparently functions only where the statutory period
is considered a statute of limitations, is inapplicable to an action
brought to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud .3
ARTICLE 3 - JURISDICTION AND SERvicE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE
OF COURT
CPLR 301: Doing business doctrine liberalized.
In Frumner v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc.,35 the plain-
tiff, a New York resident, sued three defendants: Hilton Hotels
Limited [Hilton *(U.K.)], a British Corporation; Hilton Hotels
International; and Hilton Hotels Corporation. The last two were
Delaware corporations doing business in New York. The suit arose
from personal injuries sustained by plaintiff at Hilton's (U.K.)
hotel in England.
Hilton (U.K.), the lessee and operator of the hotel, moved to
dismiss plaintiff's complaint for personal injuries on the ground
that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The
Court of Appeals, affirming a denial of the motion, found that
Hilton (U.K.), though it had no New York office, bank account
or telephone number, had certain minimum contacts with the State
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the New York courts. The
Court found that the Hilton Reservation Service, a separate cor-
poration doing business in New York, did all the business which
Hilton (U.K.) would have done had it been represented in New
York by its own officials. 6 The common ownership of Hilton
(U.K.) and the Reservation Service gave rise to an inference of
broad agency powers on the part of the Reservation Service. This
justified a conclusion that Hilton (U.K.) was "present" within
the meaning of CPLR 301.
8 19 N.Y.2d 444, 227 N.E.2d 389, 280 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1967) (affirming
the appellate division, fourth department).
347B McKINNEYS CPLR 214(7), supp. commentary 56 (1966).
35 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1967).8GAccording to the majority, the Service did publicity and public rela-
tions work for Hilton (U.K.) and other Hilton Hotels. It also accepted
and confirmed room reservations for the various Hilton Hotels. The dis-
sent apparently believed that the Service only "'confirn[s] availabilities'
at various hotels (not merely Hilton Hotels) 'based on forecasts supplied
by the hotels."' Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d
533, 541, 227 N.E.2d 851, 856, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 48 (1967). Compare
Miller v. Surf Properties, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 475, 151 N.E.2d 874, 176
N.Y.S.2d 318 (1958).
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
A rigorous dissent stated that the majority extended personal
jurisdiction over the foreign corporation "simply because of its
relationship with subsidiary or affiliated corporations of a parent
corporation."3 7  It was argued that the refusal to recognize the
distinctions between validly organized and separately managed
corporations could generally discourage the investment of risk
capital and might lead to reciprocal treatment of American corpora-
tions in foreign countries when jurisdictional questions such as that
facing the Court in the instant case arose. In sum, the dissent
warned, the effect of such an extension of the "doing business"
rule on the "flexibility and promotion of world-wide business enter-
prises would be drastic and unhealthy."38s
Upon examination of the salient facts of the instant case, i.e.,
that the Reservation Service and Hilton (U.K.) were separate and
distinct corporate entities; that the Hilton complex was not used to
defraud, deceive or mislead those who dealt with it; and that the
Reservation Service was not the exclusive agent of Hilton (U.K.),
one must conclude that the result in the Frummer case represents
the most liberal rendering of the doing business doctrine ever
drawn by New York's highest court.
CPLR 302: Substitution of personal representative for deceased
after initiation of action ruled constitutional.
CPLR 302 recites that the courts of New York may exercise
personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary or his executor or
administrator as to a cause of action arising from any of the
enumerated acts in the same manner as if he were a domiciliary.
CPLR 313 provides that an individual subject to the jurisdiction
of the New York courts under CPLR 301 or CPLR 302, or
his executor or adminstrator, may be served with summons with-
out the state in the same manner as service is made within the
state.
In Rosenfeld v. Hotel Corporation of America, 9 the decedent,
a Massachusetts resident, was validly served with process during
his lifetime. He died before the cause of action was tried. Subse-
quent to a stay of the proceedings, the plaintiffs moved to have the
decedent's non-resident executors substituted pursuant to CPLR
1015(a).- ° Substitution was ordered and the executors were per-
sonally served in Massachusetts pursuant to CPLR 313. The
37 Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 540,
227 N.E.2d 851, 855, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 46 (1967).
38 Id. at 543, 227 N.E.2d at 858, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
3020 N.Y.2d 25, 228 N.E.2d 374, 281 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1967).
40 This section provides: "If a party dies and the claim for or against
him is not thereby extinguished the court shall order substitution of the
proper parties."
1968]
